Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law
Volume 17 | Issue 1

Article 3

2009

Private School Tuition at the Public's Expense: A
Disabled Student's Right to a Free Appropriate
Public Education
Michael J. Tentido
American University Washington College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Tentido, Michael J. "Private School Tuition at the Public's Expense: A Disabled Student's Right to a Free Appropriate Public
Education." American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law. 17, no. 1 (2009): 81-111.

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law by an authorized administrator
of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.

Tentido: Private School Tuition at the Public's Expense: A Disabled Studen

PRIVATE SCHOOL TUITION AT THE
PUBLIC’S EXPENSE: A DISABLED
STUDENT’S RIGHT TO A FREE
APPROPRIATE PUBLIC EDUCATION
MICHAEL J. TENTINDO*
I. Introduction ..............................................................................................83
II. Background .............................................................................................85
A. The IDEA and Tuition Reimbursement: A Disabled
Student’s Right to a Free Appropriate Public
Education (FAPE) .....................................................................85
B. The Supreme Court’s Recognition of the Implicit Parental
Right to Tuition Reimbursement ...............................................85
C. Limitations on the Parental Right to Tuition Reimbursement .....87
D. The Courts of Appeals’ Circuit Split ...........................................88
III. Analysis .................................................................................................91
A. The Second Circuit Appropriately Interpreted
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) of the IDEA in Frank G. and Tom F. .......91
1. IDEA § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) Does Not Require
Mandatory Public School Attendance for Disabled
Students as a Prerequisite for Tuition Reimbursement........92
2. The Statutory Purpose of the IDEA Evidences the
Appropriateness of the Second Circuit’s Approach.............96
3. The Second Circuit’s Interpretation Is Consistent with
Burlington and § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) Should Not Bar a
Subclass of Disabled Children from Receiving a FAPE .....98
4. The Legislative History Shows that the IDEA Does Not
Require a Mandatory Public School Try-Out Period for
Parents to Obtain a Tuition Reimbursement for
Unilateral Private School Placement .................................100
*

J.D. Candidate, May 2009, American University, Washington College of Law;
B.A. 2006, magna cum laude, Boston University. Many thanks to the Journal staff for
their hard work in preparing this piece for publication, especially my editor, Cheryl
Torralba, and my mentor, Brenna Greenwald. Lastly, I would like to thank my family,
especially my parents, Vincent and Marylyn—their unwavering love, support, and
encouragement serve as my inspiration every day.

81

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2009

1

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 17, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 3

82

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 17:1

5. The Department of Education Rejected the
Interpretation Developed by the First Circuit in
Greenland ..........................................................................102
6. The Eleventh Circuit Has Similarly Adopted the
Second Circuit’s Approach and Recognized the
Importance of Offering All Disabled Students a FAPE.....102
B. The Second Circuit’s Approach Correctly Recognizes that
Sufficient Statutory Safeguards and Court Precedent Exist
to Ensure that Parents Will Not Abuse § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii)...103
1. The Three Threshold Requirements Created by the
Court and Codified in the IDEA Ensure that Parents
Seeking Reimbursement Will Not Abuse
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) ...........................................................104
2. The Statutory Requirements of Notice, Reasonableness,
and Cooperation Also Ensure that Parents Will Not
Abuse § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii)................................................106
3. Parents Seeking Tuition Reimbursement Also Bear the
Financial Risk when Attempting to Prove that
Reimbursement Is Necessary.............................................108
4. Opponents of the Second Circuit’s Approach
Overestimate the Economic Impact of Tuition
Reimbursement Claims on School Districts ......................108
IV. Conclusion...........................................................................................109

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol17/iss1/3

2

Tentido: Private School Tuition at the Public's Expense: A Disabled Studen

2009]

AT THE PUBLIC’S EXPENSE

83

I. INTRODUCTION
On September 5, 2006, Tom Freston resigned as the President and Chief
Executive Officer of the entertainment company Viacom Inc., and was
awarded an $85 million severance package.1 A year later, on October 1,
2007, Mr. Freston’s attorneys successfully argued before the United States
Supreme Court that the New York City Department of Education had to
pay $21,819 for his disabled son’s private school education.2
In Board of Education of New York v. Tom F., the Court, in a one
sentence 4-4 split per curiam decision, affirmed the Second Circuit’s
decision, and held that Mr. Freston could collect a tuition reimbursement
from New York City despite unilaterally placing his disabled son in private
school before his son received any special education or related services
from the city’s public schools.3 However, while Mr. Freston was awarded
a tuition reimbursement, the decision did not establish precedent on this
important issue because the Court failed to reach a majority opinion.4
Interestingly, despite failing to reach a majority opinion in Tom F., the
Court denied certiorari on a similar case, Frank G. ex rel. Anthony G. v.
Board of Education of Hyde Park.5 If the Court had granted certiorari in
1. See David Lieberman, Viacom CEO Freston Out, Dauman Takes Leadership
Post; Dooley Named to New Position of Chief Administrative Officer, USA TODAY,
Sept. 6, 2006, at 1B (stating that Freston is a cable television pioneer who Viacom
pushed aside, in a startling move, as a result of falling stock prices); David Lieberman
& Laura Petrecca, What Split Freston, Viacom?; Company Seen Slow in Evolving,
USA TODAY, Sept. 6, 2006, at 4B (noting that Freston worked at Viacom for twentysix years and appeared to be a skillful marketing executive); see also Tim Arango, Rifts
in Family and Companies Hang Over Redstone’s Legacy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2008, at
C1 (explaining that as part of Freston’s $85 million deal with Viacom, he was
prohibited from discussing the severance package publicly).
2. See Bd. of Educ. v. Tom F. ex rel. Gilbert F., 128 S. Ct. 1, 1 (2007); John
Hechinger, Special Education: When Should Taxes Pay Private Tuition?, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 1, 2007, at B1 (recognizing that while serving as a top Viacom executive, Freston
filed suit against the New York City Board of Education on principle and promised to
donate any tuition reimbursement to charity).
3. See Tom F., 128 S. Ct. at 1 (affirming the Second Circuit by an evenly divided
court).
4. See Robert Barnes, Court Is Split, Won’t Hear Special-Education Case, WASH.
POST, Oct. 11, 2007, at A08 (explaining the significance of the Court’s failure to create
precedent: although only a small number of students are affected by the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act, the number of students receiving private school tuition
is rapidly increasing); see also Mark Fass, City Loses Round on Tuition Payback Policy
for Disabled, 238 N.Y.L.J. 1, 4 (2007) (stating that Justice Kennedy left the courtroom
during oral arguments and, in accordance with Court protocol, did not reveal the reason
for his recusal).
5. 128 S. Ct. 436 (2007) (denying certiorari on a Second Circuit case finding that
parents are entitled to a tuition reimbursement under § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) of the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) even when they place their
disabled child in a private school without first trying a public school program, only
where the public school program was inappropriate and the parents provided timely
notice). But see Greenland Sch. Dist. v. Amy N. ex rel. Katie C., 358 F.3d 150, 159
(1st Cir. 2004) (stating that as a threshold requirement under § 1412(a)(10)(ii), tuition
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Frank G. and reached a precedent-making decision it might have clarified
the issue of whether parents can obtain a tuition reimbursement under the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) after unilaterally
placing their disabled student in private school without first attending a
public school special education program.6 The issue, however, remains
unresolved.7
This Comment argues that although the Supreme Court ruled in favor of
Mr. Freston in Tom F., the Court should establish binding precedent and
interpret the IDEA as allowing requesting parents to obtain a tuition
reimbursement when they place their disabled child in a private school
even if their child never obtained special education services from a public
agency. Part II explains the statutory requirements of the IDEA pertaining
to tuition reimbursements and provides a detailed summary of Supreme
Court and lower court precedents involving tuition reimbursements under
the IDEA. Part III argues that the Second Circuit correctly interpreted
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) of the IDEA to allow parents tuition reimbursements
despite their decision not to use the special education services in public
schools for their child, particularly in light of the statutory purpose of the
IDEA: to provide a free appropriate public education to all disabled
students. Additionally, Part III explains that sufficient statutory safeguards
and judicial precedent exist to ensure that parents will not abuse
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) to obtain a tuition reimbursement without a good faith
claim. Finally, this Comment concludes by arguing that because
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii)
implicitly
allows
for
retroactive
tuition
reimbursements for parents such as Mr. Freston and that sufficient statutory
safeguards exist to protect school boards against bad faith claims, the Court
should adopt the Second Circuit’s interpretation of § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii),
thereby providing parents with a tuition reimbursement for appropriate
private school placement of their disabled child.

reimbursement is only available for children who have previously received or requested
special education and related services while in public school).
6. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (2005); Gary Mayerson, Supreme Court
Autism Education Ruling Upholds Parents’ Right to “Day in Court,” JURIST, Oct. 18,
2007, available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/hotline/2007/10/parents-right-to-day-incourt-upheld-in.php (describing Frank G. as a companion case to Tom F. and stating
that Justice Kennedy again recused himself from the decision to deny certiorari). Note
that although § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) refers to parents, the definition of parents under the
Act also encompasses single parents. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(23)(A)-(D) (2005).
Accordingly, this Comment uses “parents” rather than “parent” when referring to any
parental conduct concerning tuition reimbursements under the IDEA. Furthermore, a
parent includes a natural parent, an adoptive parent, an individual acting in place of
natural or adoptive parents (including a grandparent, stepparent, or other relative) with
whom the child lives, an individual legally responsible for the child’s welfare, and in
certain cases, a foster parent or an individual assigned to be a surrogate parent. See id.
7. See Mayerson, supra note 6 (noting that Tom F. does provide relief for families
residing within the Second Circuit).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The IDEA and Tuition Reimbursement: A Disabled Student’s Right to a
Free Appropriate Public Education
Under a 1997 Amendment, the IDEA mandates that schools must
provide disabled children with a “free appropriate public education”
(FAPE) developed through an “individualized education program” (IEP).8
If parents feel that a public school deprived their child of a FAPE, the
IDEA allows them to bring their grievances to an impartial hearing and, if
necessary, the courts.9 Under the IDEA, if a FAPE is not provided, courts
have the power to grant appropriate relief, including tuition
reimbursements to the parents of a disabled child who previously obtained
special education and related services from or under the authority of a
public agency.10 Thus, if parents send their disabled child from a public
school to a private school, both the IDEA and judicial precedent recognize
their parental right to obtain a tuition reimbursement if (1) the school board
fails to offer an appropriate IEP; (2) the child’s private school placement
was proper under the IDEA’s requirements; and, (3) equitable
considerations support granting relief.11 Therefore, as evidenced in Tom F.,
the issue concerning tuition reimbursements under the IDEA emerges when
parents unilaterally place their disabled child in private school without the
child ever receiving special education services from a public agency.12
B. The Supreme Court’s Recognition of the Implicit Parental Right to

8. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5) (2005)
(establishing that a FAPE must be obtained in the least restrictive environment); see
also Allan G. Osborne, Jr., Is a Parent Who Places a Child With a Disability in a
Private School Entitled to Tuition Reimbursement if the Child Has Never Attended a
Public School? Board of Education of the City of New York v. Tom F., 219 EDUC. L.
REP. 887, 889 (2007) (citing Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359
(1985)) (detailing that it is the purpose of the IDEA to provide all children with the
opportunity to obtain a FAPE).
9. See Osborne, supra note 8, at 888 (noting that while the IDEA mandates that
parents and educators develop the IEP, Congress recognized that disagreements may
occur).
10. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (stating that parents need not have the
agency’s consent or a referral to place their child in private school and receive tuition
reimbursement so long as that agency failed to offer a FAPE); see also Osborne, supra
note 8, at 888 (claiming that courts typically grant relief through court orders
mandating corrective action).
11. See § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (noting that a FAPE must be made available to the
student in a timely and appropriate manner); see also Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Dep’t
of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 374 (1985) (establishing that courts also consider equitable
factors pertaining to the reasonableness of parental conduct).
12. See Osborne, supra note 8, at 895 (stating that although Mr. Freston
successfully argued at an impartial administrative hearing that the IEP was
inappropriate for his son, Gilbert, Mr. Freston was denied a tuition reimbursement by
the trial court because Gilbert never attended public school).
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Tuition Reimbursement
Prior to enactment of § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) in 1997, the Supreme Court
decided two important cases regarding tuition reimbursements for private
school placement of disabled students.13 In Burlington School Committee
v. Department of Education, the Court held that the IDEA implicitly allows
tuition reimbursements for unilateral private school placement when a child
receives inappropriate special education services from a public school.14
The Court asserted that the IDEA permits tuition reimbursements so long
as the child’s private school placement was appropriate and the public
school system did not offer the child a FAPE.15 The Court reasoned that if
parents lacked the remedy of reimbursement, they would be forced to
accept a flawed IEP to the detriment of their child, a result directly contrary
to both the IDEA’s purpose of providing a FAPE to all disabled children
and the parental right to fully participate in developing their child’s IEP.16
Still, the Court reaffirmed that tuition reimbursements are not available if
the school system can prove that it proposed and could implement an
appropriate IEP.17
In Florence County School District Four v. Carter, the Supreme Court
held that parents need not place their child in a state-approved private
school to obtain a tuition reimbursement.18 Again, the Court reasoned that
denial of tuition reimbursements in such circumstances would be against
the IDEA’s statutory purpose of providing a FAPE to all qualified disabled
students.19
13. See id. at 889 (suggesting that the 1997 amendments to the IDEA were merely
an incorporation of prior case law into the IDEA).
14. 471 U.S. at 370-73 (affirming that the IDEA allows for a tuition
reimbursement, even if a disabled student’s parents removed him from public school
before the IEP was ruled inappropriate, to prevent parents from being forced to leave
their child in what may turn out to be an inappropriate educational placement); see also
Osborne, supra note 8, at 895 (noting that the trial court denied Mr. Freston a tuition
reimbursement because the child in Tom F. never attended public school, unlike the
child in Burlington).
15. See Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370 (reasoning that because Congress empowered
the judiciary to grant appropriate relief, it is clear from the IDEA that retroactive tuition
reimbursement qualifies as appropriate relief).
16. See id. (stating further that if the Court were to deny reimbursement to parents,
then the procedural safeguards in the IDEA would be incomplete); see also Osborne,
supra note 8, at 890 (recognizing that the Court also determined that reimbursement
merely required the school system to pay expenses they would have had to pay if they
had initially developed a proper IEP, and that parental violations of the IDEA status
quo provisions do not constitute a waiver of their right to reimbursement).
17. See Burlington, 471 U.S. at 373 (establishing that parents who place their child
into a private school from public school do so at their own financial risk because if a
court eventually finds that an IEP was appropriate, reimbursement must be denied).
18. 510 U.S. 7, 13 (1993) (affirming that the allowance of tuition reimbursements
for parents does not place an unreasonable burden on school systems because the
school system has the initial ability to offer an appropriate IEP within a public or
private setting).
19. See id. at 12 (citing Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370) (stating that Congress
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C. Limitations on the Parental Right to Tuition Reimbursement
After Congress passed the 1997 amendments to the IDEA, the Supreme
Court developed the “presumption of competence” as a procedural
safeguard to protect school districts against false claims by parents seeking
retroactive reimbursement.20 This presumption, created by the Court in
Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, places the burden of persuasion on a
child’s parents to prove that the school district’s offered IEP was
inappropriate.21 Thus, when parents seek to challenge an IEP offered by a
school district, the school district’s IEP is presumed to be appropriate and
the parents have the burden to prove otherwise.22
While the Supreme Court willingly granted tuition reimbursements to the
parents in Burlington and Carter, lower courts have denied retroactive
reimbursement when parents move their child from public to private school
without providing notice of such private school placement.23 Courts have
held that school officials must have notice of any parental disagreement
with an IEP and must be given the opportunity to modify an IEP
voluntarily before parents may remove their child and obtain a tuition
reimbursement.24 This notice requirement is now codified in the IDEA,
which requires parents to provide school officials with written notification
of their desire to place their child in a private school at the public’s
expense.25 Furthermore, based on prior court decisions, the IDEA allows
intended to allow for retroactive reimbursement to parents when the school system
failed to eventually offer an appropriate IEP).
20. See Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 62 (2005) (holding that the
burden of proof is on the party challenging the IEP); see also Mayerson, supra note 6
(stating that while the Court had already developed the “presumption of competence”
in Schaffer, the Justices discussed this topic at great length during the oral arguments in
Tom F.); Kelly D. Thomason, Note, The Costs of “Free” Education: The Impact of
Schaffer v. Weast and Arlington v. Murphy on Litigation Under the IDEA, 57 DUKE
L.J. 457, 460 (2007) (arguing that while the Court’s decision in Schaffer is justified,
when considered with other Court precedent, it creates a significant burden on parents
and ignores the realities of the IDEA litigation process).
21. See 546 U.S. at 62 (noting that because the party challenging the IEP has the
burden of proof, in rare instances that party could be the school district rather than the
child’s parents).
22. See Mayerson, supra note 6 (explaining that in Tom F. at least four Justices
concluded that Congress did not intend for this presumption to be irrebuttable).
23. See Osborne, supra note 8, at 891 (noting that the right to notice was
established before the 1997 amendments, and that refusal to provide notice will result
in a denial of a reimbursement award).
24. See Greenland Sch. Dist. v. Amy N. ex rel. Katie C., 358 F.3d 150, 161 (1st
Cir. 2004) (holding that due to the parents’ failure to provide proper notice,
reimbursement must be denied because the purpose of the notice requirement is to give
public schools the opportunity to provide a FAPE before a child enrolls in private
school); Evans ex rel. Evans v. Dist. No. 17, 841 F.2d 824, 832 (8th Cir. 1988)
(arguing that when there is no reason to believe that school officials would refuse
changes to an IEP, notice is required to permit the school district the opportunity to
make appropriate changes).
25. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii)(I)(aa) (2005) (stating that courts can deny
or reduce tuition reimbursements if, at the most recent IEP team meeting the parents
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for a reduction or denial of retroactive tuition reimbursement if parents fail
to cooperate with school officials in the evaluation process.26 Additionally,
reimbursement can be reduced or denied if a court finds that a child’s
parent acted unreasonably.27 Therefore, parents must provide the school
system with notice and a reasonable opportunity to evaluate their child, or
risk forfeiting any claim to a tuition reimbursement.28
D.

The Courts of Appeals’ Circuit Split

Both the Supreme Court and the IDEA expressly allow for retroactive
tuition reimbursement when parents provide proper notice and a reasonable
opportunity for evaluation before removing their child from a public to a
private school.29 However, the federal circuit courts of appeal are split as
to whether parents can unilaterally place their child in a private school and
still obtain a tuition reimbursement when the child never attended a public
school special education program.30 Therefore, as a result of the Supreme
Court’s failure to create a precedent in Tom F., the circuit split remains
unresolved.31
attended prior to removal of the child to private school, the parents neither informed
school officials that they were rejecting the proposed placement of their child, nor
provided the IEP team with a statement of parental concerns and their intent to enroll
their child in private school); id. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii)(I)(bb) (establishing that notice
must be provided within at least ten business days prior to removal of the child from
public school).
26. See § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii)(II) (maintaining that even if the school system is
properly notified, reimbursement may be reduced or denied if parents refuse to make
the student available for evaluation).
27. See id. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii)(III) (2005) (establishing that when determining
whether a parent acted unreasonably, a reviewing court must specifically examine the
actions taken by the requesting parents); see also Tucker ex rel. Tucker v. Calloway
County Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 495, 499 (6th Cir. 1998) (affirming the district court’s
denial of tuition reimbursement because the parents acted unreasonably by making a
unilateral decision to get the “world’s best” program for their child and had not given
the school district an opportunity to develop an appropriate IEP).
28. See Osborne, supra note 8, at 891 (explaining that notice violations constitute
the primary example of how tuition reimbursements are reduced or denied under both
case law and the IDEA).
29. See Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 372 (1985)
(establishing that the school board’s restrictive interpretation of the IDEA would defeat
the statutory purpose of the IDEA to provide a FAPE).
30. See Osborne supra note 8, at 892-97 (noting the differences between the First
and Second Circuits’ approaches to this issue, and stating that the Court’s decision in
Tom F. should resolve this dispute).
31. Compare Frank G. ex rel. Anthony G. v. Bd. of Educ., 459 F.3d 356, 375 (2d
Cir. 2006) (claiming that the First Circuit’s strict interpretation of § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii)
in Greenland is not dispositive because the First Circuit decided the case based on a
notice violation, and the statute is hardly plain and unambiguous), cert. denied, 128 S.
Ct. 436 (2007), with Greenland Sch. Dist. v. Amy N. ex rel. Katie C., 358 F.3d 150,
161 (1st Cir. 2004) (reasoning that because the disabled child did not receive special
education services at her public school and her parents did not request a special
education evaluation prior to her private school enrollment, tuition reimbursement for
her subsequent placement in a private school is not allowed under the IDEA). But see
Brief for the Respondent, Bd. of Educ. v. Tom F. ex rel. Gilbert F., 128 S. Ct. 1 (2007)
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In Greenland School District v. Amy N., the First Circuit held that the
IDEA does not enable parents of disabled students to obtain tuition
reimbursements when they unilaterally place their child in private school
without first enrolling their child in a public school special education
program.32 In Greenland, Katie’s parents placed her in a private school for
children with learning disabilities without requesting a special education
evaluation from the public school system.33 Eventually, her parents
requested that Katie be evaluated for a disability, but subsequently rejected
the school board’s IEP which called for Katie to attend public school.34
Based on their rejection of the IEP, Katie’s parents petitioned the court for
a tuition reimbursement for her private school placement.35
The First Circuit barred retroactive reimbursement, reasoning that based
on the plain language of § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii), tuition reimbursement is
unavailable to parents who unilaterally place their child in private school
when their child did not first enroll in a public school special education
program.36 Therefore, if a parent requests a tuition reimbursement for
private school placement of their disabled student, the First Circuit has
created a statutory threshold requirement mandating that students first
receive special education services from a public school.37
(No. 06-637), 2007 WL 2088641, at *15 (arguing that because the court in Greenland
denied reimbursement due to a failure to provide notice, its strict interpretation of
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) constitutes dicta, thus, its interpretation should not be considered
relevant when reviewing reimbursement cases such as Tom F.).
32. 358 F.3d at 159-60 (justifying a strict interpretation of § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii)
because the 1997 amendments to the IDEA sought to control government spending for
students whose parents unilaterally placed them in private school).
33. See id. at 153 (explaining that after leaving public school Katie was also asked
to withdraw from one private school before being placed in a private school for special
education); see also Osborne, supra note 8, at 892 (noting that while Katie, the student
in Greenland, attended public schools before her private school enrollment, she never
received special education services in the public school system).
34. See Greenland, 358 F.3d at 155-56 (stating that the school system questioned
whether Katie had a learning disability).
35. See id. at 156 (noting that a hearing officer determined that the IEP offered by
the public school system was inappropriate for Katie’s learning disabilities and
awarded Katie’s parents $48,000 for private school tuition reimbursement). This
ruling, however, was reversed by the district court, which held that Katie’s parents
were not entitled to reimbursement under the IDEA due to the statute’s failure to
recognize tuition reimbursement in such circumstances. Id.
36. See id. at 159-60 (holding that because Katie’s parents refused to provide
adequate notice, retroactive reimbursement must be denied); see also Frank G. ex rel.
Anthony G. v. Bd. of Educ., 459 F.3d 356, 376 (2d Cir. 2006) (stating that although the
First Circuit in Greenland inappropriately denied tuition reimbursement because the
IDEA does not require such a statutory threshold requirement, it reached the
appropriate result because notice was not given to school officials, unlike in Frank G.,
where ample notice was provided), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 436 (2007).
37. See Greenland, 358 F.3d at 160 n.7 (acknowledging, however, that there is
some legislative history suggesting that Congress meant to include children who
requested but did not receive special education services from a public agency during
their time in the public school system); Ms. M. ex rel. K.M. v. Portland Sch. Comm.,
360 F.3d 267, 271-73 (1st Cir. 2004) (affirming the Greenland approach and stating
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In stark contrast to the First Circuit’s approach, the Second Circuit
recognized the importance of granting tuition reimbursements to provide all
children with a FAPE.38 The Second Circuit’s approach, exemplified in
Frank G. ex rel. Anthony G. v. Board of Education of Hyde Park, asserts
that because the statutory purpose of the IDEA is to provide all disabled
students with a FAPE, retroactive tuition reimbursement must be implicitly
allowed under § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) despite the student never having
obtained special education services from a public agency.39 In Frank G.,
the court reasoned that while the disabled student never attended public
school—because the IEP offered by the public school system was
inappropriate and private school placement enabled the child to obtain a
FAPE—the IDEA implicitly allowed for tuition reimbursements for private
school placement.40
Similar to the Second Circuit’s approach in Frank G., the Eleventh
Circuit also determined that § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) does not require disabled
students to first attend special education programs at a public school to
allow their parents to obtain a tuition reimbursement for their private
school placement.41 In M.M. ex rel. C.M. v. School Board of Miami-Dade
County, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that reimbursement would still be a
suitable remedy even if a child had not received special education services
from a public agency based on the broad equitable powers of a reviewing
court as developed in Burlington.42
Thus, while the Second Circuit’s approach garnered the support of the
Eleventh Circuit and was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Tom F., due to
the Court’s inability to reach a majority opinion in Tom F., the split
between the First and Second Circuits remains unresolved.43
that the 1997 amendments restricted the circumstances in which reimbursement is
permissible).
38. See Frank G., 459 F.3d at 370 (expressing that denying tuition reimbursements
because of a child’s failure to obtain special education services from a public agency
directly hinders the purpose of the IDEA to provide all children with a FAPE).
39. See id. (interpreting § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) as ambiguous and, therefore, finding
that retroactive tuition reimbursement is an acceptable remedy so long as the
procedural safeguards of the IDEA are satisfied and equitable considerations justify
relief).
40. See id. at 376 (noting that unlike in Greenland, the parents in Frank G.
provided school officials with the requisite notice, therefore tuition reimbursement was
mandatory).
41. See M.M. ex rel. C.M. v. Sch. Bd. of Miami-Dade County, 437 F.3d 1085,
1098 (11th Cir. 2006) (denying reimbursement because a FAPE was offered to the
child, but stating that tuition reimbursement would have otherwise been an acceptable
remedy).
42. See id. (holding that the disabled child, who suffered from significant hearing
problems, had in fact received special education services from a public agency when
she attended the county’s early intervention program before she turned three-yearsold).
43. See id. (asserting that the IDEA does not bar tuition reimbursements when a
disabled child never received special education services from a public agency because
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III. ANALYSIS
In both Frank G. and Tom F., the Second Circuit appropriately
interpreted § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) of the IDEA because the language of the
statute is not plain and unambiguous, and its interpretation is consistent
with the statutory purpose of the IDEA to provide a FAPE to all disabled
students.44 Additionally, unlike the First Circuit’s opinion in Greenland,
the Second Circuit’s approach correctly recognizes that sufficient statutory
safeguards and prior court precedent exist to ensure that parents will not
abuse tuition reimbursement under the IDEA.45
A. The Second Circuit Appropriately Interpreted § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) of the
IDEA in Frank G. and Tom F.
IDEA § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) allows parents of disabled children to receive
tuition reimbursements when their child has previously received special
education and related services from a public agency.46 Upon first glance,
this provision might suggest that for parents to receive a tuition
reimbursement after a failed IEP, they must first send their child to public
school.47 However, as the Second Circuit in Frank G. appropriately
recognized, the meaning of this provision is hardly clear.48 Therefore, for
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) to be consistent with the purpose of the IDEA,
such a holding would cause absurd results: it would contradict the purpose of the IDEA
to provide a FAPE and force parents to place their disabled child in an inappropriate
IEP to preserve their right to reimbursement); see also Mayerson, supra note 6
(predicting that future Supreme Court action regarding the issue is inevitable).
44. See Frank G., 459 F.3d at 368 (stating that because § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) is
ambiguous, further interpretation of the statute is warranted).
45. See Osborne, supra note 8, at 887 (asserting that the IDEA consists of a
complex system of due process safeguards, which a parent must follow or risk a loss or
deduction in a reimbursement award).
46. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (2005). The statute states:
[i]f the parents of a child with a disability, who previously received special
education and related services under the authority of a public agency, enroll
the child in a private elementary school or secondary school without the
consent of or referral by the public agency, a court or a hearing officer may
require the agency to reimburse the parents for the cost of that enrollment if the
court or hearing officer finds that the agency had not made a free appropriate
public education available to the child in a timely manner prior to that
enrollment.
Id.
47. See Greenland Sch. Dist. v. Amy N. ex rel. Katie C., 358 F.3d 150, 159 (1st
Cir. 2004) (stating that inherent in § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) is a threshold requirement that
tuition reimbursement is only available for children who have previously received
special education services in a public school setting); Balt. City Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs
v. Taylorch, 395 F. Supp. 2d 246, 249 (D. Md. 2005) (holding that § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii)
permits only one result: parents whose child never attended special education services
in a public setting are not eligible for reimbursement).
48. See Frank G., 459 F.3d at 376 (holding that § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) is inherently
unclear because it is subject to numerous interpretations, which the First Circuit did not
recognize).
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unilateral private school placement must be implicitly allowed under the
statute.49
1. IDEA § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) Does Not Require Mandatory Public School
Attendance for Disabled Students as a Prerequisite for Tuition
Reimbursement
When interpreting the meaning of a statute, a court must first examine its
plain language to determine whether the statute has a plain and
unambiguous meaning.50 Whether a statute is plain and unambiguous is
determined by referring to the language of the provision itself, the specific
context in which the language is used, and the broader context of the statute
in its entirety.51 Based on these three rules of statutory interpretation, as
the Second Circuit correctly held, § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) is not plain and
unambiguous.52
a. The Statutory Language of § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) Does Not Exclude
Parental Tuition Reimbursement After Unilateral Placement of a
Disabled Child in a Private School
In Greenland, the First Circuit held that the plain language of
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) creates a statutory threshold requirement that
retroactive reimbursement is only available for children who previously
received special education and related services while in public school.53
However, because no limitations are explicitly mentioned in
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii), the First Circuit’s approach incorrectly inserts a
statutory threshold requirement where none is required.54
As the Second Circuit correctly held, § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) does not
49. See id. at 368 (reasoning that because the statutory language of
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) is consistent with Burlington, to provide disabled students with a
FAPE the IDEA must enable their parents to receive tuition reimbursements if an IEP
is inappropriate and private school placement is appropriate).
50. See id. (asserting that if the statute is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is
coherent and consistent, then no further inquiry into the meaning of the statute is
required).
51. See id. (noting that language is ambiguous if it is capable of multiple meanings
when viewed objectively by a reasonable observer after a full review of the statute).
52. See id. at 370 (stating that it is hardly clear that § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) allows
retroactive reimbursement in one circumstance, while excluding reimbursement in
others).
53. See Greenland Sch. Dist. v. Amy N. ex rel. Katie C., 358 F.3d 150, 159 (1st
Cir. 2004) (establishing that a threshold requirement exists within § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii),
which prohibits parents from obtaining a tuition reimbursement under the IDEA if they
unilaterally place their child in private school, and fail to give notice of that placement).
54. See Frank G., 459 F.3d at 369, 375 (distinguishing Greenland, which held that
tuition reimbursement is “only” available to parents whose child had previously
received special education and related services from a public agency, by asserting that
the IDEA allows for tuition reimbursement regardless of whether the child ever
attended special education programs at a public school).
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mention any specific limitations to the remedies available under the
IDEA.55 Section 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) does not explicitly say tuition
reimbursements are only available to parents whose disabled child
previously received special education and related services from a public
school.56
Nor does § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) specifically state that
reimbursements are unavailable to parents whose disabled child has not
previously received special education services in the public school
system.57 Additionally, § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) does not require a mandatory
public school try-out period for a disabled student, nor does it explicitly
mandate that the student receive special education services while in a
public school setting.58
Since § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) does not specifically refer to any statutory
limitations, none should implicitly be required.59 Furthermore, the
presence of numerous possible interpretations suggests that
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) is hardly plain and unambiguous.60
b. The Specific Context of § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) Does Not Exclude
Parental Tuition Reimbursement After Unilateral Placement of a
Disabled Child in a Private School
When interpreting a statutory provision, a court must also examine the
specific context in which the provision was used.61 Under this analysis, the
55. See id. at 375-76 (stating that Greenland resolved the issue of ambiguity by
amending the language of the statute itself and by assuming that the ambiguous
language of § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) becomes clear by adding the word “only” to the
subsection, despite the word “only” not appearing in the provision).
56. See id. at 368 (asserting that multiple interpretations are possible because the
word “only” can not be read into the statute and thus, § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) does not
create a threshold requirement).
57. See id. (maintaining that retroactive reimbursement is necessary to comply with
the statutory purpose of the IDEA because a failure to allow for such reimbursement
would deny children a FAPE); see also Brief for the Respondent, supra note 31, at *15
(asserting further that § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) does not limit the remedies available under
the IDEA and case law). But see Greenland, 358 F.3d at 159 (establishing that tuition
reimbursements are not available to parents whose disabled child has not attended a
public school special education program).
58. See Brief for the Respondent, supra note 31, at *15 (establishing that a try-out
period would be directly contrary to the statutory purpose of the IDEA because it
would deny a FAPE to children who otherwise would be eligible for private school
placement under the IDEA). But see Greenland, 358 F.3d at 159 (requiring as a
threshold requirement that disabled children attend a public school special education
program before obtaining a tuition reimbursement based on a strict interpretation of
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii)).
59. See Brief for the Respondent, supra note 31, at *15 (rejecting the argument that
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) sub silentio, or by implication, bars parents from obtaining tuition
reimbursement under the IDEA).
60. See Frank G., 459 F.3d at 370-71 (noting that language is ambiguous when it is
capable of more than one meaning when viewed by a reasonably intelligent objective
observer).
61. See, e.g., Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341-42 (1997) (holding that
“employee” can be interpreted to mean “former employees”).
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First Circuit’s interpretation of § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) would be inconsistent
Section
with the clear implication of § 1412(a)(10)(C)(i).62
1412(a)(10)(C)(i) asserts that a state which makes a FAPE available to a
disabled student need not pay for the child’s education if the child’s parents
elect to place the student in a private school.63
Since § 1412(a)(10)(C)(i) does not refer to any other specific limitations
on tuition reimbursements, the clear implication of this provision is that
reimbursement is available in all circumstances, including when the child
has only attended private school, so long as the agency failed to offer the
student a FAPE.64 Based on this interpretation, § 1412(a)(10)(C)(i) directly
contradicts the First Circuit’s interpretation of § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) because
the First Circuit’s interpretation denies a tuition reimbursement to parents
whose disabled child, despite never attending a public school special
education program, was denied a FAPE by a reviewing school board.65
Therefore, because § 1412(a)(10)(C)(i) allows for reimbursement for
unilateral private school placement in all circumstances so long as a FAPE
has not been offered, § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) should not be interpreted as
limiting the availability of tuition reimbursement as a remedy for such
private school placement.66
c. Prohibiting Unilateral Placement of Disabled Students in Private
Schools Would Be Inconsistent with the Broader Context of the
IDEA
Finally, when interpreting the plain language of a statute, a court must
also examine the broader context of the statute as a whole.67 The IDEA, in
62. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(i)
(2005) (establishing that if a FAPE is offered by the state, a parent may not receive a
tuition reimbursement after placing a child in private school).
63. See id. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(i) (distinguishing itself from § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii),
where a FAPE is not offered to the student); see also Frank G., 459 F.3d at 370 (noting
that § 1412(a)(10)(C)(i) when read alone suggests that if a school district fails to offer a
FAPE, parents can obtain a tuition reimbursement despite unilateral placement of their
child in a private school, notwithstanding their failure to have their child attend special
education programs under the authority of a public agency).
64. See Frank G., 459 F.3d at 370-71 (holding that § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) is hardly
unambiguous because it clearly can be subject to numerous possible interpretations,
thus, a reviewing court must further analyze the provision to determine the true intent
of Congress).
65. See Greenland Sch. Dist. v. Amy N. ex rel. Katie C., 358 F.3d 150, 159 (1st
Cir. 2004) (prohibiting parents from unilaterally placing their disabled child in private
school if the child did not first receive special education programs from a public
agency).
66. See Frank G., 459 F.3d at 370-71 (holding that because § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) is
ambiguous, further interpretation is needed to determine the requirements for tuition
reimbursements under the IDEA).
67. See id. at 368, 370-71 (stating that “language is ambiguous when it is capable
of more than one meaning when viewed objectively by a reasonably intelligent
observer who has analyzed the context” of the statute in its entirety).

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol17/iss1/3

14

Tentido: Private School Tuition at the Public's Expense: A Disabled Studen

2009]

AT THE PUBLIC’S EXPENSE

95

§ 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii), authorizes reviewing courts to use broad discretion
when determining available remedies under the statute.68 Under this
provision, a reviewing court hearing a FAPE challenge has the authority to
provide relief as it deems appropriate.69
The Supreme Court also interpreted this statute as authorizing broad
discretion to reviewing courts when granting remedies under the IDEA.70
Specifically, a reviewing court has broad discretion where the form of
relief is not specified in the provision, as is the case with
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii).71 Therefore, under the IDEA, a court can use its
broad discretion to grant appropriate relief so long as the relief is consistent
with the statutory purpose of the IDEA.72 If the Court had denied Mr.
Freston a tuition reimbursement, the denial would have been directly
inconsistent with § 1415(i)(2)(C) because tuition reimbursements for
private school placement have in the past been considered both appropriate
relief and true to the statutory purpose of the IDEA.73 Also, because
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) does not explicitly state any limitations concerning
available remedies, a court should have broad discretion in determining
which remedies are available.74 Thus, the Second Circuit correctly held
that § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) is not plain and unambiguous because it does not
specifically prohibit tuition reimbursements for unilateral private school
placement under any circumstances and such tuition reimbursements are an
appropriate remedy under the IDEA. Therefore, further court interpretation
is needed to determine the actual meaning of § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii).75

68. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) (2005) (allowing for courts to authorize any
remedy deemed appropriate so long as it is within the statutory purpose of the IDEA).
69. See id. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) (establishing that any decision must be based on a
preponderance of the evidence); see also Frank G., 459 F.3d at 369 (noting that in
Burlington, the Court interpreted the identically worded 1984 predecessor to
§ 1415(i)(2)(C) to allow, as appropriate relief, private school placement while the
parents and the school litigated their issues).
70. See Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369-70 (1985)
(stating that the ordinary meaning of the identically worded predecessor to
§ 1415(i)(2)(C) grants broad discretion to a reviewing court in determining remedies,
as long as the type of relief is appropriate in light of the statutory purpose of the IDEA).
71. See id. (noting that no type of relief is specified in the IDEA, other than that the
relief must be appropriate).
72. See Frank G., 459 F.3d at 368-69 (asserting that § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) is not the
only section of the IDEA that speaks to the remedy that a court may award).
73. See Burlington, 471 F.3d at 369-70 (arguing that because a mandatory try-out
period would disadvantage disabled students, it is directly contrary to the statutory
purpose of the IDEA: to provide all disabled students with a FAPE).
74. See Frank G., 459 F.3d at 369-70 (stating that when no limitations are
explicitly provided in a statutory provision, the court has broad discretion in granting
relief, including reimbursements to parents for any type of unilateral placement).
75. See id. at 370 (explaining that when statutory terms are ambiguous, the court
must review that statute based on the traditional canons of statutory construction to
resolve any ambiguity).
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2. The Statutory Purpose of the IDEA Evidences the Appropriateness of
the Second Circuit’s Approach
Once a statutory provision is determined to be ambiguous, a court will
focus on the primary purpose of the statute to determine the meaning of its
ambiguous provision.76 The statutory purpose of the IDEA is to provide
each disabled student with a FAPE.77 The Second Circuit’s approach
correctly realizes that retroactive tuition reimbursement, including when
parents unilaterally place their disabled child in private school without first
having their child enroll in a public school special education program, is
necessary to achieve a FAPE.78
a. The Remedy of Retroactive Tuition Reimbursement Complies with
the Statutory Purpose of the IDEA to Provide All Disabled
Students with a FAPE
The central tenet of the IDEA is that all children with disabilities have
the right to a FAPE.79 To effectuate this purpose, a state that receives funds
under the IDEA must provide assurances to the federal government that a
FAPE is available to each resident disabled student.80 This requirement
ensures that the educational mission of the IDEA is preserved.81
If the Supreme Court denied Mr. Freston a tuition reimbursement after
complying with all the procedural safeguards of the IDEA, then New York
would have denied a FAPE to a disabled student in direct contradiction to
the statutory purpose of the IDEA.82 Therefore, the First Circuit’s
76. See id. at 370-71 (asserting that although there are numerous canons of
statutory interpretation a court may use, certain canons of statutory interpretation, such
as examining the purpose and context of the statute, are particularly helpful when
analyzing a provision such as § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii)).
77. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1) (2005) (noting further that the child of a requesting
parent must also be disabled and offered an IEP). But see Balt. City Bd. of Sch.
Comm’rs v. Taylorch, 395 F. Supp. 2d 246, 249 (D. Md. 2005) (claiming that one
purpose of the 1997 amendments to the IDEA was to narrowly restrict the
circumstances in which reimbursement is available to control government expenditures
for disabled students unilaterally placed in private school by their parents).
78. See Frank G., 459 F.3d at 372 (holding that a strict interpretation of
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) would deny a disabled student a FAPE).
79. See Brief for the Respondent, supra note 31, at *18 (stating that the school
board’s argument that a FAPE must be denied to Mr. Freston’s son is inconsistent with
the core principal of the IDEA).
80. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A) (detailing that a FAPE must be offered to all
disabled children within a state between the ages of three and twenty-one, including
those children with disabilities who have been suspended or expelled from school).
81. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400(c)(1) (West 2008) (stating that Congress enacted the
FAPE requirement because it determined that improving educational programs and
academic results for disabled students must be an essential aspect of national policy).
82. See Brief for the Respondent, supra note 31, at *7-8 (arguing that in Tom F.
there was no question that Gilbert was denied a FAPE because the impartial hearing
officer specifically found that the Board of Education had not offered an appropriate
IEP, and this determination was upheld upon appeal).
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interpretation that a FAPE must be denied to students who have not first
received special education and related services from a public school is
directly at odds with the central purpose of the IDEA.83 As the Supreme
Court has consistently held, any interpretation of the IDEA that undermines
a student’s ability to obtain a FAPE must be defeated.84 Thus, as the
Second Circuit correctly recognizes, if a public school cannot offer a
disabled student a FAPE, placement in private school at the public’s
expense is appropriate to satisfy the statutory purpose of the IDEA.85
b. Adoption of the First Circuit’s Interpretation Would Lead to Absurd
Results and Nullify the Effectiveness of the IDEA
Adoption of the approach developed in Greenland would result in two
harmful consequences directly inconsistent with the statutory purpose of
the IDEA.86 First, the First Circuit’s approach would leave many disabled
children, who have been denied a FAPE, without an effective remedy.87
This interpretation would especially harm disabled students appropriately
placed in special education-based private schools whose families can no
longer afford the school’s cost of tuition.88 If tuition reimbursement is
denied to these parents, their child would be unable to continue with the
83. See id. (asserting that denying Mr. Freston’s request for a tuition
reimbursement would render the IEP process essentially meaningless because even if
an IEP that does not provide a FAPE is offered, parents would be required to have their
child try the improper program to obtain a reimbursement).
84. See Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 368 (1985)
(holding that the IDEA is intended to give disabled students an education that is both
free and appropriate, and the statute should not be interpreted to defeat any one of those
objectives).
85. See id. at 369-70 (stating that tuition reimbursements for unilateral private
school placement is warranted because the public school system inevitably would have
had to pay for such a program because it is an appropriate IEP).
86. See Frank G. ex rel. Anthony G. v. Bd. of Educ., 459 F.3d 356, 372 (2d Cir.
2006) (mandating that an ambiguous statute must be interpreted to avoid absurd
results), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 436 (2007); see also Brief for the Respondent, supra
note 31, at *38 (stating that the First Circuit’s interpretation would also cause
uncertainty and hardship for parents, children, and school districts).
87. See Brief for the Respondent, supra note 31, at *38 (arguing that both children
in public and private school settings could lack an effective remedy under a strict
interpretation of § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) because such students would include: (1) public
school students whose disabilities were only recently diagnosed but whose proposed
IEP does not provide for a FAPE; (2) public school students who were promised
certain services under an IEP but who have not received such services in a timely
manner; and (3) children entering public school for the first time but who have not been
identified under the “child find” program of the IDEA).
88. See id. (stating that the Board’s interpretation of § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) would
deny retroactive tuition reimbursement remedy to all parents, even those who provided
notice and followed all other statutory safeguards of the IDEA). But see Brief for U.S.
Conference of Mayors et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Bd. of Educ. v.
Tom F. ex rel. Gilbert F., 128 S. Ct. 1 (2007) (No. 06-637), 2007 WL 1453288, at *8
(claiming that children without a remedy do not exist because all disabled preschoolers
receive special preschool education under § 1419 of the IDEA and, therefore, will have
had previously received special education from a public agency).
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appropriate educational program for his or her disability, and the statutory
purpose of the IDEA to provide a FAPE to all disabled children would not
be satisfied.89
Second, the threshold requirement described in Greenland creates a
mandatory try-out period in which disabled students are forced to endure
enrollment in a potentially inappropriate public school special education
program at the expense of their education and development so that their
parents may remain eligible for a tuition reimbursement.90
An
inappropriate educational setting for children with severe disabilities, such
as autism, can have significant negative consequences on their
development and academic progress.91 Furthermore, as evidenced by the
duration of the litigation in Tom F., a mandatory try-out period would
likely last for a considerable length of time.92 As a result, this try-out
period accomplishes nothing toward the development of the student, but
rather the disabled student’s development and academic progress inevitably
suffer.93 Thus, as exemplified by these negative consequences of the First
Circuit’s approach, tuition reimbursement for parents whose children have
not enrolled in special education programs in a public school setting is an
appropriate remedy under the IDEA.94
3. The Second Circuit’s Interpretation Is Consistent with Burlington and
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) Should Not Bar a Subclass of Disabled Children from
Receiving a FAPE
Rather than have a child endure an inappropriate education program in a
public school setting, the Supreme Court has clearly held that the IDEA
89. See Brief for the Respondent, supra note 31, at *39 (stating that the Board
failed to realize that a FAPE is not an aspiration but a requirement that must be met in
order to satisfy the statutory purpose of the IDEA).
90. See id. (arguing that a statutory threshold requirement has no textual support in
the IDEA and is not what Congress intended when passing the statute); see also Gina
Green, Early Behavioral Intervention for Autism: What Does Research Tell Us?, in
BEHAVIORAL INTERVENTION FOR YOUNG CHILDREN WITH AUTISM: A MANUAL FOR
PARENTS AND YOUNG PROFESSIONALS 29, 38 (Catherine Maurice et al. eds., 1996)
(finding that over the last two decades virtually all studies have concluded that early
and intensive intervention in cases of autism is the most effective and appropriate
intervention, and can produce large, comprehensive, enduring, and meaningful
improvements in the lives of children suffering from autism).
91. See Green, supra note 90, at 42 (stating that early intervention and education
actually constitutes the primary treatment for autistic students).
92. See Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 370 (1985)
(explaining that a final judicial decision on the merits of an IEP usually comes a year or
more after the academic term covered by that IEP has ended).
93. See Susan N. ex rel. M.N. v. Wilson Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 751, 760 (3d Cir. 1995)
(asserting that children are not static individuals, and neither their disabilities nor
academic development wait for the resolution of litigation).
94. See Frank G. ex rel. Anthony G. v. Bd. of Educ., 459 F.3d 356, 369 (2d Cir.
2006) (noting that the IDEA grants a reviewing court broad discretion when
determining an appropriate remedy), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 436 (2007).
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enables parents to unilaterally place their disabled child in private school
and still obtain a tuition reimbursement for such placement.95 Based on
this interpretation of the IDEA, the Court should also hold that parents may
receive a tuition reimbursement even if their child never received special
education or related services under the authority of a public agency.96
In Burlington, the Court specifically created a two-prong test concerning
the appropriateness of tuition reimbursements for private school placement,
but implicitly added a third prong: “equitable considerations [relating to the
reasonableness of the action taken by the parents] are [also] relevant in
fashioning relief.”97 Therefore, the Burlington Court created three
threshold requirements that must be satisfied before a reviewing court
grants relief: (1) an IEP is inappropriate, (2) the private school placement is
appropriate, and (3) if equitable considerations favor granting relief.98
Additionally, the Court held that the IDEA was intended to provide
disabled students with a FAPE, and the IDEA should not be interpreted to
defeat or contradict this objective.99 Finally, the Court asserted that parents
should not have to choose between an inappropriate educational setting for
their child and forfeiting their claim to tuition reimbursement.100
Therefore, because the IEP offered to Mr. Freston’s son was
inappropriate and private school placement was proper, the tuition
reimbursement awarded to Mr. Freston was consistent with Burlington
because a denial of the equitable remedy of tuition reimbursement would
be directly inconsistent with providing his son a FAPE.101 Furthermore,
because § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) codified Burlington, this interpretation is
consistent with the modern IDEA.102 Thus, since the Supreme Court
95. See Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370 (stating that Congress did not intend to deny
retroactive reimbursement, therefore, it is an appropriate remedy under the IDEA); see
also Osborne, supra note 8, at 898 (asserting that it is clear that both the IDEA and case
law allow parents to receive tuition reimbursements for unilateral placement from
public school to private school so long as notice is provided to the school district).
96. See Brief for the Respondent, supra note 31, at *18-19 (arguing that the Second
Circuit’s interpretation clearly follows from Burlington because it is consistent with the
central purpose of the IDEA to provide a FAPE).
97. See Frank G., 459 F.3d at 363-64 (citing Burlington, 471 U.S. at 374).
98. See Burlington, 471 U.S. at 369-70, 374 (granting further relief only under this
test without reference to a fourth prong calling for a mandatory try-out period); see also
Frank G., 459 F.3d at 363-64 (citing Burlington, 471 U.S. at 374).
99. See Burlington, 471 U.S. at 372 (asserting that the Act mandates that a FAPE
be provided and that a contrary interpretation is directly inconsistent with the IDEA).
100. See id. at 369 (stating that to remain consistent with the statutory purpose of the
IDEA, a reviewing court should be granted broad discretion when deciding on
appropriate remedies).
101. See id. at 372 (allowing reimbursement because the town’s interpretation of the
Act forced parents to leave a child in what may turn out to be an inappropriate
education program or risk sacrificing their claim to a tuition reimbursement, a result
which is directly inconsistent with the statutory purpose of the IDEA to provide a
FAPE).
102. See Brief for the Respondent, supra note 31, at *19-20 (arguing that because
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previously upheld reimbursement in similar factual circumstances, courts
should remain consistent and not create a subclass of disabled children by
establishing clear precedent granting tuition reimbursements to parents
whose disabled child failed to obtain special education services from a
public agency before their unilateral placement in private school.103
4. The Legislative History Shows that the IDEA Does Not Require a
Mandatory Public School Try-Out Period for Parents to Obtain a Tuition
Reimbursement for Unilateral Private School Placement
Although the Supreme Court is often reluctant to analyze the legislative
history surrounding the IDEA, the statute’s legislative history supports the
interpretation of § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) developed by the Second Circuit.104
The legislative history prior to the 1997 amendments to the IDEA indicates
that Congress did not desire any unnecessary delay in a child’s placement
or change of placement that might be caused by a lengthy administrative
process.105 Rather, Congress desired a flexible approach designed to meet
both the needs of the child and the state.106 In direct contrast to such
congressional intent, the First Circuit’s approach requires parents to place
their disabled child in public school under an inappropriate IEP,
unnecessarily delaying appropriate placement while the administrative
process is exhausted.107
Furthermore, the legislative history surrounding § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii)
also suggests that tuition reimbursement in factual circumstances like those
in Tom F. is an acceptable remedy under the IDEA.108 Most importantly,
the legislative history does not expressly deny the availability of tuition

§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) directly tracks the facts and holding of Burlington, it should be
viewed as a codification of Supreme Court precedent that existed before the 1997
amendments to the IDEA, and noting that nowhere in the IDEA did Congress
disapprove of or intend to restrict the holding of Burlington).
103. See Burlington, 471 U.S. at 372 (explaining that if a provision is interpreted to
cut off parents’ right to reimbursement, the principal purpose of the IDEA would be
defeated as if tuition reimbursements were never made available to parents).
104. See Osborne, supra note 8, at 897 (noting that in recent IDEA interpretation
cases, the Court has been more likely to analyze the plain meaning of the text or statute
rather than analyze the legislative history to ascertain congressional intent in the
formation and passage of the law).
105. See 121 CONG. REC. 37,412 (1975) (arguing that administrative appeals can be
long and tedious and that the placement of a child should not be delayed unnecessarily
while the administrative process is exhausted).
106. See Burlington, 471 U.S at 373 (holding that the legislative history of the IDEA
supports the interpretation that unilateral private school placement of a child can be
appropriate under the IDEA).
107. See id. at 372 (claiming that unnecessary delay caused by denying unilateral
private school placement is in contrast with congressional intent).
108. See Brief for the Respondent, supra note 31, at *15-16 (acknowledging that the
legislative history surrounding § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) is sparse, but what does exist does
not support a strict interpretation of § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii)).
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reimbursements when a student has never obtained special education
services in a public school setting.109 Rather, the legislative history gives
no indication that Congress desired to amend the IDEA’s provisions
regarding tuition reimbursement.110 Additionally, the legislative history
does not reveal any attempt by Congress to limit the vast discretion of
reviewing courts to grant tuition reimbursements.111
Because Congress failed to mention or refer to any threshold
requirements before the enactment of § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii), the legislative
history, albeit not entirely decisive, contains no support for the First
Circuit’s interpretation of a mandatory try-out period.112 Even the First
Circuit acknowledges that the legislative history suggests that Congress
desired to include children who requested, but had not yet received, special
education services during their time in public school as being eligible for a
tuition reimbursement.113 Accordingly, the strict interpretation approach
developed by the First Circuit is inherently flawed because the First Circuit
acknowledges that the legislative history supports tuition reimbursement in
certain circumstances not expressly stated in § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii).114
Therefore, based on the legislative history surrounding the IDEA, and in
particular § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii), it seems likely that Congress intended
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) to provide tuition reimbursements for parents such as
Mr. Freston.115
109. See Frank G. ex rel. Anthony G. v. Bd. of Educ., 459 F.3d 356, 373-74 (2d Cir.
2006) (stating that because the legislative history of § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) does not
expressly restrict the remedy of tuition reimbursements, it may not be interpreted as
denying tuition reimbursements when a child has never obtained special education
services in a public school setting), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 436 (2007).
110. See id. (asserting that Congress intended for parents to be reimbursed for the
cost of private school educational placement without the public agency’s consent under
certain conditions, such as when a due process hearing officer or judge determines that
a FAPE has not been offered in a timely manner).
111. See id. at 374 (arguing that the House report is significant for what it does not
say, especially because it does not reveal any intention of Congress to limit the
discretionary powers of a reviewing court that were developed in Burlington).
112. See Brief for the Respondent, supra note 31, at *15 (arguing that the creation of
a mandatory try-out period is a new and significant prerequisite and, because Congress
failed to refer to such a threshold requirement, a strict interpretation of
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) is implausible).
113. See Greenland Sch. Dist. v. Amy N. ex rel. Katie C., 358 F.3d 150, 159-60 (1st
Cir. 2004) (refusing to discuss this issue further because Katie’s parents did not provide
the school district with notice as required under the IDEA); see also H.R. REP. NO.
105-95, at 91-93 (1997), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 78, 89-90 (neglecting to
specifically state that children who never attended or received special education or
related services from a public agency should be denied tuition reimbursements for
private school placement once a FAPE has been denied).
114. See Frank G., 459 F.3d at 375-76 (explaining that the problem with Greenland
is that it believes that § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) is clear, but fails to recognize that it is hardly
plain and unambiguous).
115. See 143 CONG. REC. S4,297-4,301 (1997) (statement of Sen. Harkin) (stating
only that the bill supports current IDEA policy that a public agency is not required to
pay a tuition reimbursement for private school placement if that agency made a FAPE
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5. The Department of Education Rejected the Interpretation Developed
by the First Circuit in Greenland
The Department of Education’s Office of Special Education and
Rehabilitative Services has also expressly rejected the interpretation
developed by the First Circuit.116 Specifically, the Department of
Education has stated that reimbursement serves as an equitable remedy that
courts may order when appropriate.117 Therefore, the agency held that
courts retained their broad authority, as recognized in Burlington and
Carter, to award appropriate relief if a public agency failed to offer a
FAPE.118
Since this interpretation was formulated in notice and comment
rulemaking and constitutes a reasonable interpretation of the statute, it
should be entitled to deference by a reviewing court.119 Nonetheless, the
Department of Education’s stance is further evidence that the Second
Circuit’s holdings in Frank G. and Tom F. constitute the correct
interpretation of § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii).120
6. The Eleventh Circuit Has Similarly Adopted the Second Circuit’s
Approach and Recognized the Importance of Offering All Disabled
available to the student).
116. See List of Correspondence from January 4, 1999 through March 31, 1999, 65
Fed. Reg. 9,178, 9,178 (Dep’t of Educ. Feb. 23, 2000) (arguing that tuition
reimbursements should not be denied if a child has not received special education
services from a public agency); see also Frank G., 459 F.3d at 373 (stating that while
the agency’s interpretation comes in the form of an informal letter, deference to a
policy letter can be appropriate when the statutory language of a provision is
ambiguous and not plain).
117. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.403 (1999) (asserting that equitable considerations
mandate that receipt of public school special education services is not a prerequisite to
tuition reimbursement under the IDEA, and that the only relevant considerations of a
court are whether a FAPE has been provided and if tuition reimbursement is a
necessary remedy).
118. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.403 (stating that a mandatory try-out period is against the
statutory purpose of the IDEA to provide a FAPE); see also Burlington Sch. Comm. v.
Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369 (1985) (holding that the IDEA grants a reviewing
court significant discretion when fashioning an appropriate remedy); Florence County
Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter ex rel. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 15-16 (1993) (reaffirming the
Court’s decision in Burlington, and granting reviewing courts significant discretion
when issuing remedies under the IDEA).
119. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843-44 (1984) (holding that when a statute is ambiguous, and under the subject matter
of a particular federal agency, that agency’s official interpretation of the statute is
entitled to deference by a reviewing court as long as the interpretation is reasonable);
see also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 235, 237 (2001) (stating that the
Court has noted numerous indicators to recognize when Chevron deference would be
appropriate, including an agency’s power to participate in notice and comment
rulemaking).
120. See Brief for the Respondent, supra note 31, at *25-27 (asserting that a policy
letter written by the director of the Department of Education’s Office of Special
Education Programs serves as conclusive evidence that the government supports the
statutory interpretation developed by the Second Circuit).

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol17/iss1/3

22

Tentido: Private School Tuition at the Public's Expense: A Disabled Studen

2009]

AT THE PUBLIC’S EXPENSE

103

Students a FAPE
Finally, similar to the Second Circuit’s holdings in Frank G. and Tom F.,
the Eleventh Circuit has also determined that § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) does not
mandate disabled students to first attend public school special education
programs as a threshold requirement for their parents to obtain a tuition
reimbursement for their private school placement.121 The Eleventh
Circuit’s holding that reimbursement is a suitable remedy under Burlington
and that not allowing reimbursement would force parents into the untenable
position of accepting an inadequate IEP to preserve their right to
reimbursement serves as further evidence of the appropriateness of the
Second Circuit’s approach.122 Thus, because the Second Circuit’s
interpretation of § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) in Frank G. and Tom F. is also
supported by significant circuit court precedent, this approach should be
adopted by the Supreme Court as precedent.123
B. The Second Circuit’s Approach Correctly Recognizes that Sufficient
Statutory Safeguards and Court Precedent Exist to Ensure that Parents
Will Not Abuse § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii)
A common apprehension regarding the adoption of the approach
developed by the Second Circuit is that parents could easily abuse
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) and unfairly obtain a tuition reimbursement for private
school placement of their child.124 However, this fear is unwarranted
because sufficient statutory safeguards and judicial precedent exist to
ensure that parents seeking tuition reimbursement for unilateral private
school placement without ever having their child obtain special education
in a public school setting will not abuse § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) of the
IDEA.125
121. See M.M. ex rel. C.M. v. Sch. Bd. of Miami-Dade County, 437 F.3d 1085,
1098 (11th Cir. 2006) (denying reimbursement because a FAPE was offered to the
child, but also holding that despite a parent’s failure to have their child attend public
school, reimbursement is still an acceptable remedy).
122. See id. at 1099 (noting further that a contrary interpretation would cause the
absurd result of barring children from obtaining a FAPE because their disabilities were
detected before they reached school age).
123. See Brief for the Respondent, supra note 31, at *29-30 (arguing that M.M.
evidences that there is no support in the IDEA, legislative history, Department of
Education interpretations, or case law which would support the interpretation
developed by the First Circuit).
124. See Brief for the Petitioner, Bd. of Educ. v. Tom F. ex rel. Gilbert F., 128 S.
Ct. 1 (2007) (No. 06-637), 2007 WL 1434945, at *41 (asserting that the Second
Circuit’s interpretation would have a devastating economic impact on school systems
due to the potential for abuse).
125. See
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1412(a)(1)(B)(ii)(I) (2005) (establishing the initial statutory safeguard that a parent
whose child was not actually identified as being a child with a disability under § 1401
of the IDEA is not eligible for a tuition reimbursement); see also Frank G. ex rel.
Anthony G. v. Bd. of Educ., 459 F.3d 356, 363 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that states, such
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1. The Three Threshold Requirements Created by the Court and Codified in
the IDEA Ensure that Parents Seeking Reimbursement Will Not Abuse
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii)
In Burlington, the Court created a two-prong test and implied a third
element to determine whether parents are entitled to a tuition
reimbursement for private school placement.126 First, the IEP proposed by
the school district must be inappropriate.127 Second, the private school
placement of the disabled student must be appropriate in relation to the
student’s needs.128 In addition to these two requirements, because the
IDEA provides a reviewing court with significant discretion when granting
reimbursements, equitable considerations must also be made by a
reviewing court.129 Furthermore, as established in Schaffer, parents have
the burden to prove all three of these requirements, and a presumption of
competence exists in favor of the school board’s IEP.130
These requirements ensure that parents will not easily abuse
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) because, under the two-prong test developed in
Burlington, parents have a significant burden in showing both that the IEP
offered to their child was inappropriate and that their placement of their
child in private school was necessary to meet their child’s educational
needs.131 Additionally, the parental burden of having to prove both the

as New York, have established regulations to meet the goals of the IDEA and that these
regulations closely follow the IDEA’s requirements), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 436
(2007); Brief for the Respondent, supra note 31, at *41 (arguing that both the IDEA
and case law have created significant safeguards against parents who seek to abuse the
system).
126. See Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 370 (1985)
(noting that retroactive tuition reimbursements are an acceptable remedy because the
lengthy administrative and judicial review process serves to limit potential abuse);
supra Part III.A(3) for a discussion of the implied third element of Burlington.
127. See Frank G., 459 F.3d at 363 (stating that the IEP, as the key element of the
IDEA, must be developed for each handicapped child and include a comprehensive
statement of the educational needs for the disabled student with specific instructions
and services on how to meet those needs).
128. See id. (maintaining that requesting parents must satisfy both elements of the
Burlington two-part test and thus, once the public school’s IEP is determined to be
inappropriate, the subsequent placement of the child into a private school must be
deemed appropriate).
129. See id. at 363-64 (noting that the equitable considerations examined must relate
to the reasonableness of the action taken by the parents).
130. See Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 59-60 (2005) (placing the
burden on the party seeking relief to prove that an IEP is inappropriate); see also
Mayerson, supra note 6 (discussing the Court’s adoption of a “presumption of
competence” to protect the school districts when it rendered its decision in Schaffer).
131. See Frank G., 459 F.3d at 356, 364 (stating that the test for the parent to prove
the inappropriateness of an IEP and the appropriateness of private school placement is
the same: whether the IEP or private school placement is “‘reasonably calculated to
enable the . . . [disabled student] to receive educational benefits,’ and the IEP or
placement must be ‘likely to result in progress [in the student’s growth], not
regression’”).
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reasonableness of their actions and that a tuition reimbursement is
appropriate as an equitable remedy further ensures that their claims are
made in good faith.132
Also, as evidenced by Tom F., the process to prove both the
inappropriateness of an IEP and the appropriateness of private school
placement is exhaustive and time-consuming.133 In Tom F., Mr. Freston
successfully argued before an impartial hearing officer and a state
reviewing officer before being denied reimbursement by a federal trial
court, while eventually being granted a tuition reimbursement by the
Second Circuit.134 Thus, because parents seeking tuition reimbursement
must successfully argue in numerous administrative and judicial
proceedings before being granted tuition reimbursement for private school
placement, claims lacking good faith are likely to fail.135
Furthermore, while tuition reimbursement is an equitable remedy, it is
not the only remedy available to the courts.136 Also, because tuition
reimbursement is an equitable remedy, the IDEA authorizes courts to
consider the merit of the claim or the intentions of a party when granting
relief.137
Therefore, as evidenced by the statutory safeguards and the requirements
created by the Court, parents cannot easily abuse § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii)
because they have the significant burden of proving that the IEP is

132. See id. at 363-64 (arguing that tuition reimbursement is an equitable remedy
that is acceptable under the IDEA because both the Supreme Court and the IDEA itself
grant courts broad discretion when fashioning remedies for parents of disabled
children).
133. See Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 370 (1985)
(explaining that retroactive tuition reimbursement is an acceptable remedy because the
review process for granting such relief is ponderous, and decisions on the merits
usually take over a year); see also Osborne, supra note 8, at 888 (asserting that IDEA
due process reviews can take several months or years to complete).
134. See Brief for the Respondent, supra note 31, at *6-9 (noting that Mr. Freston’s
initial hearing before the impartial hearing officer took three days and included
testimony from seven witnesses, including school board education evaluators, school
psychologists, several teachers, and a special education teacher).
135. See Osborne, supra note 8, at 888 (stating that while this exhaustive process is
completed, a student must remain in his or her current educational setting or be placed
in a private school at the parents’ expense, where reimbursement is dependent on the
success of the case).
136. See id. (claiming that courts usually order prospective relief in the form of a
court order mandating that the school board take corrective action).
137. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii)(III) (2005) (establishing that a parent who
acts unreasonably could be denied reimbursement or have their reimbursement award
reduced due to their inappropriate conduct); see also Carmel Cent. Sch. Dist. v. V.P.,
373 F. Supp. 2d 402, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that reimbursement is not allowed
when parents did not have any intent of sending their child to public school and
consistently and deliberately interfered with the evaluator’s ability to review their
child’s disability); Brief for the Respondent, supra note 31, at *42 (arguing that as an
equitable remedy, tuition reimbursements can be denied to parents who intend to cheat
the system).
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inappropriate, private school placement is appropriate, and a tuition
reimbursement is a necessary equitable remedy.138 Also, in contrast to the
significant burden placed on parents by the Court, the IDEA merely
mandates that a school board offer an appropriate IEP.139 Accordingly, if
an appropriate IEP is offered and a FAPE has been provided, a tuition
reimbursement will not be granted to parents who unilaterally place their
child in private school without first having their child obtain special
education and related services from a public agency.
2. The Statutory Requirements of Notice, Reasonableness, and Cooperation
Also Ensure that Parents Will Not Abuse § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii)
In addition to the three threshold requirements for relief, the IDEA
mandates that a parent seeking to reject an IEP must provide notice of both
their intent to reject the school board’s IEP and their intent to send their
child to private school.140 Furthermore, parents must act reasonably and
grant the school board access to the child to perform evaluations of the
child for disabilities, or risk having their reimbursement award reduced or
denied.141
This notice requirement serves the important function of preventing
abuse by allowing the school board to form an IEP team, evaluate the child,
create an appropriate plan, and determine whether a FAPE can be provided
in the public school system.142 If notice is not provided, courts have denied
granting tuition reimbursements even if the IEP offered is inappropriate,
private school placement is appropriate, and equitable considerations favor

138. See Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 61 (2005) (establishing that
the requesting party, which is usually the disabled child’s parents, has the burden of
establishing all requirements that must be met for relief).
139. See Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, ex rel. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 13
(1993) (arguing that reimbursement is not necessary if a FAPE is offered to the student,
even if it is based on an IEP that orders the student’s return to public school, so long as
the offered IEP is appropriate as determined by the student’s needs); see also Brief for
the Respondent, supra note 31, at *44 (stating that it is the mandate of the IDEA to
provide a FAPE to all disabled students, and if school officials either offer a FAPE in a
public school setting or place a child in an appropriate private school setting, they need
not worry about reimbursement claims).
140. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii)(aa) (2005) (establishing that notice must be
made at the most recent IEP team meeting, where parents must inform those present
that they are rejecting the proposed placement of the student in favor of private school
placement).
141. See § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii)(III) (stating that a determination whether a parent
acted unreasonably can be made by the court when deciding upon appropriate relief);
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii)(II) (establishing that prior to the removal of the child from public
school, school officials must inform the child’s parents of their intent to evaluate the
student, providing the parents with a statement of the purpose of the evaluation).
142. See Frank G. ex rel. Anthony G. v. Bd. of Educ., 459 F.3d 356, 375 (2d Cir.
2006) (stating that providing notice to the school district before a child is placed in
private school is an essential aspect of the IDEA’s reimbursement policy), cert. denied,
128 S. Ct. 436 (2007).
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reimbursement.143 The notice requirement allows the school board to
create and offer a disabled student an appropriate IEP, and, therefore,
serves as an important safeguard against reimbursement claims that lack
good faith or merit.144
Furthermore, the requirements that parents act reasonably and not
interfere with the school board’s ability to evaluate their child also
guarantee that parents with claims lacking merit or good faith will not be
granted reimbursement.145 Similar to the notice requirement, courts have
routinely denied tuition reimbursements when parents unreasonably restrict
the school board’s access to a child or inappropriately interfere with the
school board’s ability to offer an appropriate IEP.146 These statutory
requirements also serve to ensure that only parents who fully cooperate
with the school board and file their reimbursement claim in good faith
receive a tuition reimbursement under § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii).147 Thus, as a
result of the statutory requirements to provide notice, act reasonably, and
cooperate, it is difficult for parents with claims lacking good faith or merit
to obtain a tuition reimbursement.148

143. See Greenland Sch. Dist. v. Amy N. ex rel. Katie C., 358 F.3d 150, 161 (1st
Cir. 2004) (holding that due to the parent’s failure to provide proper notice,
reimbursement must be denied because the school district did not have the opportunity
to provide a FAPE); Frank G., 459 F.3d at 375-76 (agreeing with the result reached in
Greenland due to the lack of notice provided to the school district, and holding that
courts have uniformly held that reimbursement must be denied when parents
unilaterally place their child in private school without notifying the school board of
their dissatisfaction with an offered IEP).
144. See Greenland, 358 F.3d at 161 (arguing that the notice requirement is essential
for the school board in their development of an appropriate IEP).
145. See Patricia P. ex rel. Jacob P. v. Bd. of Educ., 203 F.3d 462, 468 (7th Cir.
2000) (asserting that without minimal cooperation, a school district cannot evaluate a
disabled student; thus, if a parent fails to sufficiently cooperate, they must be denied
reimbursement).
146. See id. at 469 (holding that reimbursement under the IDEA is subject to parties
cooperating with the school board, and because the school board had no opportunity to
evaluate the disabled student, reimbursement is inappropriate and forfeited); P.S. v.
Brookfield Bd. of Educ., 353 F. Supp. 2d 306, 315 (D. Conn. 2005) (finding that
because the school board was entitled to an evaluation of the student and the parents
failed to cooperate by not making their child available for the evaluation, the child’s
parents lost their right to reimbursement), aff’d, 186 Fed. App’x 79 (2d Cir. 2006); see
also Osborne, supra note 8, at 891 (noting that courts routinely deny reimbursements
based on equitable principles, and reasoning that equity prevents reimbursement
awards because school officials did not have the opportunity to evaluate the student and
make recommendations regarding appropriate placement).
147. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii) (2005) (establishing that if the statutory
requirements are not met by a requesting parent, reimbursement may be reduced or
denied).
148. See Brief for the Respondent, supra note 31, at *41 (noting that sufficient
procedural safeguards exist to ensure that parents are not able to cheat the system and
obtain tuition reimbursements on a claim based on bad faith).
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3. Parents Seeking Tuition Reimbursement Also Bear the Financial Risk
when Attempting to Prove that Reimbursement Is Necessary
In Burlington, the Court held that parents who unilaterally place their
child in private school do so at their own peril, and this risk serves as a
significant deterrent against claims for reimbursement which lack good
faith or merit.149 A petitioning parent bears the financial risk of private
school placement, the cost of legal expenses, the burden of proving the
appropriateness of tuition reimbursement, along with the uncertainty and
lengthy duration of the administrative and judicial due process
proceedings.150 Therefore, unless a parent strongly believes that an IEP is
inappropriate and private school placement is best suited for their child’s
needs, they are unlikely to request reimbursement due to the considerable
expenses they would incur when attempting to overcome the significant
burden in favor of the school district.151
4. Opponents of the Second Circuit’s Approach Overestimate the Economic
Impact of Tuition Reimbursement Claims on School Districts
Opponents of the Second Circuit’s interpretation of § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii)
in Frank G. and Tom F. fear those decisions will lead to significant
fraudulent reimbursement claims which will in turn result in a serious
economic drain on local school systems.152 However, these opponents fail
149. See Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 373-74 (1985)
(asserting that allowing tuition reimbursements for parents who unilaterally place their
disabled child in private school is an acceptable remedy because these parents bear the
financial risk of obtaining a tuition reimbursement); see also Brief for the Respondent,
supra note 31, at *41 (arguing that placing the financial burden on requesting parents is
another safeguard developed by the Court to ensure that parents will not abuse the
system).
150. See Thomason, supra note 20, at 485 (explaining that overwhelming burdens
on parents exist in IDEA litigation, and these burdens ignore the realities of the IDEA
litigation process); see also Brief for the Respondent, supra note 31, at *41 (stating that
the financial risk construct is now codified in the IDEA and serves as a significant
deterrent against claims that are false or too speculative).
151. See Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct. 1994,
2011 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asserting that actions seeking reimbursement are
less likely to be frivolous because parents are not likely to pay for litigation over a
tuition reimbursement without a strong belief that the IEP offered is not appropriate);
Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 297-98 (2006)
(holding that a parent who prevails and retains a tuition reimbursement for unilateral
private school placement may recover reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of their costs,
but these costs do not include any fees resulting from the services of expert witnesses);
see also Thomason, supra note 20, at 472, 484-85 (noting that “only five out of every
ten thousand children who receive special education services request IDEA due process
hearings,” and that although reasonable attorneys’ fees are reimbursed to successful
parents, any reimbursement of attorneys’ fees does not significantly ease the financial
burden placed on parents by the Court because requesting parents must rely on expert
witnesses to overcome the burden of persuasion established in Schaffer).
152. See Julie Rawe, Who Pays for Special Ed., TIME, Sept. 25, 2006, at 62 (arguing
that many education specialists believe that special education costs threaten to drain
budgets for school endeavors, such as athletics or programs for gifted or talented
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to recognize that the Second Circuit’s interpretation will likely have no
substantive economic impact on public school systems.153
In fact, only 1.48% of all disabled children receive their education from
a private school at the public’s expense, a percentage that has been
consistent over the years.154 Furthermore, on an annual basis, money spent
by public schools for private school placement of disabled students
amounted only to 0.24% of the entire national education budget of $382
billion.155
Also, these opponents fail to understand that the First Circuit’s
interpretation could result in a greater financial burden on public school
systems, as school districts would have to allocate more resources, such as
teachers and classroom space, for every disabled student attending a public
school.156 Therefore, due to the small amount of students obtaining private
school special education at the public’s expense, and because of the
significant statutory safeguards and judicial precedent which ensure that
parents will not abuse § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) of the IDEA, the Second
Circuit’s approach will not result in a significant economic drain on public
school systems.157
IV. CONCLUSION
Since the Supreme Court failed to reach binding precedent in Tom F., the
issue of whether parents can unilaterally place their disabled child in
students).
153. See Jay P. Greene & Marcus A. Winters, Debunking a Special Education Myth:
Don’t Blame Private Options for Rising Costs, EDUC. NEXT, Spring 2007, at 69-70,
available at http://www.hoover.org/publications/ednext/5895486.html (explaining that
while some private school placement can be expensive to the public, the overall cost of
such placement nationally constitutes a very small portion of public school spending).
154. See id. at 68 (asserting that private school placement is extremely rare because
out of 5,963,129 total disabled students nationwide, there are a total of 88,156 students
with disabilities enrolled in private school at the public’s expense, and these students
only amount to 0.18% of the 47,917,774 students enrolled in public school education
nationally); see also Brief for the Respondent, supra note 31, at *42 (referencing Green
& Winters, supra note 153, and noting further that most of these children were placed
in private school by a public authority, and usually they are not placed in the private
school unilaterally by their parents).
155. See Greene & Winters, supra note 153, at 69-70 (claiming that the 0.24% of the
total national budget equates to $922 million).
156. See Brief for the Respondent, supra note 31, at *48 (arguing that school
districts would have to allocate resources such as teachers, physical space, salaries,
books and supplies, school lunches, athletic programs, and social programs if every
disabled student in a locale had to first try-out the public schools for their parents to
obtain a tuition reimbursement).
157. See Greene & Winters, supra note 153, at 68 (stating that there has been “no
surge in the proportion of special education students in private settings” and that
private placement of disabled children at the parents’ request is more rare than the
already rare private placement of disabled children upon the school’s initiative); cf.
Rawe, supra note 152, at 68 (quoting an attorney who argues that going up against the
school district as a parent equates to David going up against Goliath).
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private school without first having their child obtain special education
services from a public agency remains unresolved.158 When this issue
arises again, the Court should uphold the Second Circuit’s approach
because § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) is not plain and unambiguous, and tuition
reimbursements for unilateral private school placement under all factual
circumstances that meet the statutory requirements of the IDEA, constitute
an equitable remedy that affords all disabled students a FAPE.159
Furthermore, a contrary interpretation would cause disturbing results:
forcing parents to place their disabled child in harmful educational settings
at the detriment of their child’s academic and social development.160
Finally, the Supreme Court should recognize that sufficient procedural
safeguards and judicial precedent exist to ensure that parents lacking a
good faith claim will not be successful in their attempt to obtain a tuition
reimbursement for private school placement.161 Therefore, so long as a
reviewing court has determined that an appropriate IEP for a disabled child
has not been offered and private school placement is appropriate, parents
such as Mr. Freston should not be denied tuition reimbursement for their
disabled child’s unilateral placement in private school.162

158. See Mayerson, supra note 6 (arguing that because the issue remains unresolved,
future Supreme Court action regarding tuition reimbursements and the IDEA is likely).
159. See Frank G. ex rel. Anthony G. v. Bd. of Educ., 459 F.3d 356, 368-71, 375 (2d
Cir. 2006) (explaining that because § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) has numerous interpretations,
it is inherently unclear), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 436 (2007).
160. See M.M. ex rel. C.M. v. Sch. Bd. of Miami-Dade County, 437 F.3d 1085,
1098-99 (11th Cir. 2006) (arguing that the IDEA does not bar tuition reimbursement
when a child has never attended public school because such a holding would cause
absurd results and force parents to place their child in inappropriate IEP’s to preserve
their right to reimbursement, which is in direct contradiction to the purpose of the
IDEA to provide for a FAPE).
161. See Brief for the Respondent, supra note 31, at *41 (asserting that both the
IDEA and case law have created significant safeguards to protect against parents
intending to cheat the public school system).
162. See Frank G., 459 F.3d at 363-64 (noting that equitable considerations are the
third requirement which must be met before tuition reimbursements are to be provided
to a requesting parent, and would also have to be satisfied before a parent receives a
tuition reimbursement for unilateral private school placement of their disabled child).
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